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Abstract—This paper describes the process of remaining anonymous online and its concurrent operational security
that has to be performed. It focusses particularly on remaining anonymous while purchasing online goods, resulting
in anonymously bought items. Different aspects of the operational security process as well as anonymously funding
with cryptocurrencies are described. Eventually it is shown how to anonymously purchase items and services from the
hidden web, as well as the delivery. It is shown that, while becoming increasingly difficult, it is still possible to make
anonymous purchases. Our presented work combines existing best-practices and deliberately avoids untested novel
approaches when possible.
Index Terms—OPSEC, online anonymity, bitcoin, hidden web, Tor, Dark Markets.
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INTRODUCTION
W E present a detailed approach to anony-mously purchase goods and services on-
line.
As human life shifts towards the world wide
web, the interest of large Internet companies
and government agencies in the Internet in-
creases significantly. Remaining anonymous on
the Internet has ever before been as hard as it is
today. Every webpage visited, every file down-
loaded, every email or message sent, every
purchase made, can be traced back and read by
other parties. This paper describes the methods
of remaining anonymous on the Internet and
the concurrently required operations security
processes. The first section explains the basic
principles and tools regarding the operations
security, also known as OPSEC. Thereafter, the
process of obtaining anonymous bitcoins is de-
scribed and finally the methods of purchasing
online goods is explained.
1 EXTENSIVE OPERATIONAL SECURITY
Remaining anonymous on the internet is a
though process. Anonymity cannot be obtained
through just the usage of certain tools or ser-
vices. It is a process that comes by keeping ev-
ery single asset involved in the anonymous op-
eration, anonymous and minimise the amount
of incriminating evidence on those assets. Op-
erational security, hereafter OPSEC, plays a
critical role in remaining anonymous online.
Anonymity does not work retroactively. At
the beginning of an anonymous operation, the
anonymity of all the assets involved have to
be thought of very carefully. The environment
that will protect the anonymity has to be set up
thoroughly, from the beginning. The following
subsections go into depth on the principles that
ensure a high level of anonymity.
1.1 Compartmentation
One of the key principles of OPSEC is applying
compartmentation. Compartmentation is the
limiting of the ability for persons or entities
to access information needed to perform cer-
tain tasks and isolating information as much
as possible. In this case it means that all the
digital evidence and information should be (if
possible physically) separated from each other
so that linking pieces of information is hard
and cannot be used to extend the image of
the anonymous identity that a person is using.
Straight forward examples are:
• Possessing and using different online ac-
counts (i.e. Facebook or IRC nicknames) to
sign up for anonymous services online.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
5.
07
37
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
7 M
ay
 20
15
2Fig. 1. Elements of anonymous purchasing process.
• Using different anonymous (prepaid)
credit card accounts to make purchases.
• Removing XMP metadata (that may con-
tain geolocation data) from photo’s that
a person uploads during the operation.
LulzSec member W0rmer was exposed by
not removing XMP data from a picture that
contained geo-location of his girlfriend [7],
which linked to his real identity.
But compartmentation goes as far as:
• Using numerous hardware, i.e. mobile
phones, laptops and CD-R’s (USB-devices
contain microcontrollers that can be re-
programmed into a spying device[8]), for
doing different operations or components
of an operation.
• Spoofing MAC-addresses that are used to
identify hardware.[9]
• Using different physical internet connec-
tions for different parts of an operation,
i.e. bars, hotels, open or hacked WiFi net-
works. LulzSec hacker Jeremy Hammond
was caught by identifying his laptop using
the MAC-address found on his personal
WiFi network[9].
• Doing parts of an operation in differ-
ent timezones, including never discussing
environmental aspects, i.e. weather con-
ditions. Hammond also revealed a large
amount of profiling information during
IRC chats, that were used to personally
identify him.[9]
• Removing any type of logs, i.e. syslog, chat
logs from the operating system.
It should not be possible for an observer of a
persons online activity to link properties of dif-
ferent compartments to each other. Every step
or move online has to be advised of not linking
compartments and extending the online image
of the real identity. This effect is referred to
as contamination. To prevent this, the general
principle ‘proactively paranoid’ is often used
in OPSEC.
1.2 Online identity
Depending on the kind of operation, the fake
identity that will be used, has to be as authen-
tic as possible. A layered approach is used,
meaning that one would create a fake online
identity and completely compartmentise this
identity from its real identity. This fake iden-
tity would then be used to create other fake
identities. It ensures that if one fake identify
gets compromised, it would not lead to de-
anonymization of the person’s real identity, but
instead just one ‘layer’ or ‘compartment’ of the
identity protection would have been ‘peeled
off’. In practice this means that created email
addresses point consequently only to the email
address of its previous ‘layer’ and not layers
beneath its previous ‘layer’.
As in other OPSEC practices, avoiding
contamination and profiling between the
‘wrapped’ identities is vital.
1.3 Linking assets in real life
The purchase of online goods will in almost
every case, involve the physical contact of the
person with entities that may be able to gen-
erate identifying material of the person’s real
identity. In general one should always try, for
every asset involved, to prevent purchases in
stores with camera surveillance and, obviously,
never use electronic payment methods that
may link to the real identity.
1.3.1 Purchase of hardware
In general, purchasing any kind of hardware
via online marketplaces12 is good practice (un-
less the hardware is already blacklisted due
to past usage in compromised operations).
1. http://marktplaats.nl
2. https://ebay.com
3Second hand hardware has reduced tracking
perspectives which otherwise may lead to the
de-anonymisation of the person’s real iden-
tity. By purchasing hardware in stores, the
person becomes vulnerable to in-store camera
systems. To minimise exposure, only purchase
from small local stores and start to use the
hardware only a few months after. If unique
hardware ID’s may link to the time and lo-
cation of purchase, the probability that the
owner of the store has already removed video
evidence of the moment of purchase, is larger.
Making purchases in extreme weather condi-
tions and dressing accordingly, may provide
extra cover without drawing attention, i.e. sun-
glasses/scarf and cap. If hardware is bought
online, it must never be delivered to the per-
son’s address or be paid with electronic pay-
ment systems other than anonymous prepaid
credit cards and anonymised cryptocurrencies.
It should be noted that spendings of prepaid
credit cards are monitored[10].
1.3.2 Mobile Phones and SIM cards
Only when usage of mobile phones in an
operation is mandatory, they should be used.
Due to easy localisation[4] and decryption of
communications[3], this medium is considered
insecure. Mobile phones should be disposable,
featuring a minimal OS and functionalities, re-
sulting in a reduced attack surface. The phones
should be used in combination with multiple
sim cards. Phones that will not be used any-
more should be completely destroyed. While
phones are not used, the devices should be
battery unplugged or stored in a leaden box to
prevent emission of signals, especially when a
smartphone or WiFi device is used. The phones
should never be used to make phone calls
under the real identity of the person. Again,
compartmentise and avoid contamination of
those compartments.
WiFi hotspots may keep logs of devices that
are in range. Even unconnected WiFi devices
may be logged at point of operation. This may
link back to the persons real identity.
1.4 Secure communication
Secure communication is one of the most vital
assets in an operation and if well understood,
the easiest component to perform correctly in
an anonymous operation. In general, open-
source software projects that are end-to-end
encrypted are used for secure communication.
The methods described in the following sec-
tions are, as of the moment of writing, ex-
tremely secure, as concluded from N.S.A. doc-
uments from the Snowden-leaks[1].
1.4.1 Email
One or multiple anonymous email accounts are
required that do not have personal linked in-
formation in them. Safe-mail3 is a provider that
provides email with minimal personal informa-
tion upon sign-up. Gmail also allows for easy
sign-up, although is more monitored[11] and
sign-up over Tor requires phone verification.
This email account will be used together with
GnuPG encryption of e-mails. Usage of keys
longer than 4096-bit is important and authenti-
cation tokens to protect the GnuPG private key
provide an extra layer of security. Descriptive
subjects should be avoided, as subjects of e-
mails are not encrypted.
1.4.2 IM
For Instant Messaging, a protocol named Off-
The-Record (OTR)[5] can be used. This is a
XMPP-based protocol, that can be used to com-
municate over Jabber services, i.e. securejab-
ber.me or CCC.de XMPP service4. Password
renewal on regular basis is important practice.
XMPP services that provide self-signed certifi-
cates, signed with their GnuPG private key,
provide an extra layer of security against PKI
attacks[2].
1.4.3 Voice
Open Whisper Systems is a group of open-
source contributors that build end-to-end
secure communication tools. RedPhone/Signal
is a smartphone application uses the
ZRTP protocol to provide end-to-end
VoIP. Together with TexSecure, it provides
perhaps the strongest security in mobile
communications[12]. However, it should be
noted that use of these techniques implicates
vulnerability for profiling.[15]
3. https://safe-mail.org
4. jabber.ccc.de
41.5 Hardware & Operating System
The computer used to enter the internet, should
be as lean and mean as possible so that possi-
bility to store incriminating evidence is min-
imised. This means a laptop should be used
with, preferably a pre-Intel 9455 no battery
(easy shut down is necessary), no harddisk,
WiFi chip, bluetooth, microphone and webcam.
Try to always use an ethernet connection, that
as extra fail-safe is routed over a Tor router
like P.O.R.T.A.L.6. This ensures that all Internet
traffic is routed over the Tor network. The
Tails operating system is designed to refrain
the system of storing logs and any files and
by default routes all the traffic automatically
over Tor. Persistent encrypted storages with
plausible deniability can be used to store data
using TrueCrypt7.
Tor should always be used as it grants a good
level of anonymity. The anonymity of a VPN
is only as strong as the provider is willing to
protect users data against law enforcement.[13]
VPN’s provide privacy of the users data, but
does not provide anonymity. Therefor, always
connect to a VPN via Tor, if a VPN is necessary.
Another method of remaining even more
anonymous is to route the traffic over a botnet,
and using one of the infected nodes of the
botnet as exit nodes8.
2 FUNDING WALLETS WITH ANONY-
MOUS BITCOIN
The currency that provides the most anonymity
if used well, is Bitcoin. It should be carefully
noted that all the transactions made are trans-
parent in Bitcoin blockchain. Therefore, it is
important to add a layer of anonymity. Green
et al. have shown that it is possible to build this
into Bitcoin itself and designed Zerocash[6].
This section explains how to practically ac-
company anonymity between the bitcoin wallet
and the owner.
5. ”Active Management Technology” is a technology built
into Intel chipsets after the Intel 945 that allows for remote
access.
6. https://github.com/grugq/portal
7. http://istruecryptauditedyet.com
8. It should be carefully noted that in some countries, this
method of traffic anonymization may be illegal.
2.1 Creation of anonymous wallets
Creation of anonymous wallets can be done
using multiple methods. Using bitaddress.org a
user is able to generate a valid Bitcoin wallet.
This website provides an in-browser method
using 278 random user input points. However,
this is by far the most insecure way of creating
anonymous wallets. It has to be trusted that
the JavaScript served has not been compro-
mised, either server-side or in transit. Also,
the browser itself should not be compromised
when executing the JavaScript.
More secure methods of wallet creation are
using self built versions of open source Bitcoin
wallets Armory9 or Electrum10 on an offline
machine that has never touched the internet
directly.
Fig. 2. Bitcoin wallet, consisting our of pub-
lic and private component. Created using
https://bitaddress.org
For an extra layer of security, cold storage
wallets should be used. In this method, the
private key of the wallet is air-gapped from the
online machine that is used to connect to the
blockchain.
2.2 Physical anonymous meetup
Two methods for funding wallets that in-
volve physical exposure are explained. The
first method is the most anonymous method,
if performed correctly. It consist of a physical
meetup, set up via localbitcoins.com. Buyer
(using anonymous identity) and seller agree on
a rendezvous point. The buyer pays the seller
with cash and the seller transfers the agreed
amount of bitcoins to an anonymous wallet
on the spot. It is important to ensure that the
9. https://bitcoinarmory.com
10. https://electrum.org
5rendezvous point is safe against robberies, but
is not monitored by law enforcement, i.e. CCTV
camera systems.
2.3 Bank wire using fake identify
Obtaining a fake identity allows for creation of
anonymous bank accounts. These accounts can
then be used to buy bitcoins through services
like Coinbase11 and Circle12. Obtaining a fake
passport is enough to open a bank account that
can then be used to fund bitcoin wallets. A fake
passport can be bought through the hidden
web, explained in section 3.
2.4 Bitcoin mixing
Bitcoin ‘mixing’, also known as ‘tumbling’ or
‘laundering’, is the process of anonymising bit-
coins. This is achieved by randomly moving
and shuffling small parts of bitcoins to a large
amount of wallets, with the intention of confus-
ing the trail back to the funds’ original source.
Third parties offer this anonymising service.
The ‘Big Three’ mixing services consists of
BitBlender13, Bitcoin Fog14 and Helix15. Other
derivatives of the mixing protocols exist, i.e.
SharedCoin16 and Bitmixer17 are examples of
employing a slightly different protocol. Some
mixing services may have a clear web entrance
as well, but due to possible interception of
traffic at Tor exit-nodes implying the risk of
MITM, it is recommended to always use the
hidden entrance of the service, as the con-
nection is then peer-to-peer encrypted. In this
project, Bitmixer was used to anonymise bit-
coins, in which users benefit from the instantly
available mixed bitcoins. Bitmixer uses a large
reserve of bitcoins to exchange a user’s bitcoins
with other bitcoins from the FIFO reserve. This
reserve is assembled from a large amount of
other transactions to Bitmixer. By using a time
delay of delivery, multiple delivery wallets
(also referred to as ‘forward addresses’), and
11. https://www.coinbase.com
12. https://www.circle.com/en
13. bitblendervrfkzr.onion
14. fogcore5n3ov3tui.onion
15. grams7enufi7jmdl.onion/helix
16. http://sharedcoin.com
17. bitmixer2whesjgj.onion
a custom additional fee, in-out analysis of the
Bitmixer reserve is prevented. In addition to
that, Bitmixer uses a private ‘bitcode’ that iden-
tifies a batch of previously owned bitcoins by a
user. This ensures that a user will never receive
its previously owned bitcoins after processing
by Bitmixer.
Fig. 3. Bitmixer stash, consisting a persons
bitcoins (blue) and the anonymised bitcoins re-
turned by Bitmixer.
3 PURCHASING GOODS AND SER-
VICES
The purchase of goods and services can be
either via the clear web or the hidden web, as
long as ensured that the visit of the websites is
done using the previously described methods
and that payment is done using multiple wal-
lets of which the bitcoins themselves are again
mixed to prevent analysis of purchase patterns.
The purchase of items on the hidden web
often establishes via marketplaces on the hid-
den web, called ‘Dark Markets’. Popular Dark
Markets are Agora, Middle Earth Marketplace,
Outlaw Market and Evolution18[14]. In gen-
eral, marketplaces function as an independent
‘trusted’ Man in the Middle for a transaction
between vendor and buyer. The buyer transfers
the bitcoins to a wallet maintained by the site.
The vendor is then ‘ensured’ that the funds
are available for purchase. Upon reception of
of goods by the buyer, the site transfers the
bitcoins to the vendor. Furthermore, Dark Mar-
kets are highly dependent on reputation of
vendors. This guarantees a certain amount of
trustworthiness of the vendor.
18. Evolution was the most popular marketplace after Silk
Road 1 & 2 were closed by the FBI. Evolution shut down on
March 18 2015 in an apparent ‘exit scam’, in which the site’s
administrators shut down their market abruptly in order to
steal the bitcoins kept in users’ escrow accounts. The admin-
istrators stole Bitcoins for an estimated amount of $15 million
USD.
6Fig. 4. Reputation of a vendor named ‘optiman’
on Agora.
It should be noted that physical items from
other continents have a high probability of
inspection when going through customs. In the
European Union this results in an additional
taxes (VAT), which may have implications to
the succeeding delivery process.
4 DELIVERY OF GOODS
The delivery process is the most vulnerable
component to the anonymity in the entire pur-
chasing process. Obviously, a delivery address
that is linked to the person’s identity should
never be used. There are two methods that
can be used to deliver the physical goods and
remain a high level of anonymity.
4.1 ‘Random’ drop-off point
This method consists of using a ‘random’ citi-
zen as man-in-the-middle (MITM). Upon pur-
chase of the goods online, an address other
than the buyers personal address is provided
to the vendor, with fake commonly occurring
name. This address is the address of someone
of which the buyer knows it exists and is able
to locate. Preferably, this address should be of
a person that is home often (typically aged
or disabled people) and that is relatively easy
reachable from the location of the buyer. Upon
purchase, a tracking code is provided by the
vendor. This tracking code is used to keep track
of the delivery time of the package. As soon as
the package is delivered at the MITM address,
the buyer confronts the owner of the MITM
address pretending to live on the same address,
but with a different (but similar, pretending to
be a typo) house number, (i.e. 11 instead of
111). The MITM will hand over the package,
at which point the buyer returns to its home
address, located in a different city.
This method however, has a few weak spots.
It is expected that the MITM:
• accepts the package, even though not ad-
dressed to the name of the MITM.
• is home at the moment of delivery. If de-
livery at the MITM address fails, the entire
purchase fails.
• does not refrain from opening the package.
Depending on the content, this could be
fatal for the anonymity delivery, as the
MITM may contact law enforcement.
• can not recognise or identify the face of the
buyer, during a possible interrogation.
• would not ask identification upon handing
over the package to the buyer.
4.2 Postal office
This method consists of using a ‘random’
postal office as man-in-the-middle. This
method is more reliable, but hands in a level
of anonymity and requires fake documents
of identification, which is illegal in almost
all countries. As in the previously described
method, the address of a postal office together
with a fake name, of which the buyer has
(fake) identification, would be provided to
the vendor. The package is delivered at the
postal service and the buyer will retrieve
the package, using its fake identification that
corresponds to the recipient fake name.
The weak spots in this method are:
• the buyer must be in possession of a fake
identification.
• camera’s in the postal office may reveal the
buyers real identity.
• the package (recipients name) is logged
and may be used to de-anonymise the
buyer.
• multiple fake identities at multiple postal
services should be used in order preserve
anonymity.
In this method, the postal office may be
replaced by a third party post box service
that allows physical pick-up of the delivered
packages.
75 COSTS OF ANONYMITY
As shown in this paper, anonymity requires
many assets that can rapidly result in a costly
operation. In this section, a rough overview is
given for the costs of an anonymous operation.
Component Estimated cost
Anonymous laptop e400
Air-gapped
Raspberry Pi
e50
Mobile phone (Nokia
108)
e30
SIM card e10 of which half is
credit
Mixing bitcoins (Bit-
mixer)
0.5% of the total
amount plus 0.0005
per forward address.
This table does not take into account com-
ponents like fuel for traveling, losses in price
fluctuations of bitcoin and foremost, a person’s
time.
6 CONCLUSION
We have shown that it is possible to pre-
serve a high level of anonymity on the In-
ternet while purchasing physical goods. Good
OPSEC practices like compartmentation and
encrypted communication is inevitable and es-
sential. Anonymity, as in security, is as strong
as its weakest link. We have shown different
techniques of obtaining anonymous bitcoins
that can be used to purchase virtual services
and physical goods. The anonymity is most
vulnerable at the delivery process. Finally, we
have shown that anonymity comes at a cost
that does not make it appealing to execute.
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